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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN S. JOHNSON, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
HOSPl'l'AL,, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 12970 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STA1'EMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiffs to recover damages 
for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff Calvin John-
son as a result of alleg('d negligent treatment by defend-
ant hospital while he was confined therein as a patient, 
and by plaintiff Robert Johnson, his father, to recover 
medical ex1wnses incurred by him for the care and treat-
mt>nt of the injuries sustained by his minor son. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case ~wa:o tried to a jury which returned a ver-
dict in favor of plaintiff Calvin Johnson in the amount 
of $300,000.00 general damages, and in favor of plaintiff 
Robert ,Johnson in the amount of $25,623.79 for special 
damages (medical expense). 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment b 1 . , . . . e ow an,1 
directions to enter a Judgment in favor of the d 1· .1. 
e e11Uii1r 
and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action or· ti· 
alternative a new trial. 
' Ill J' 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A - BACKGROUND AND UNDrnPU'l'ED FACT~ 
In December, 1967, plaintiff Calvin Johnson, here 
inafter called Calvin, was a 16 year old high school bo! 
At that time he developed signs and symptoms at t~, 
lower end of his spine for which he consulted Dr. Cari 
Brockbank, a general practitioner in Salt Lake Clh. 
(R. 278, 452). Dr. Brockbank diagnosed the condi!ior 
as a pilonidal cyst and recommended surgical exc1 
sion. (R. 278). Calvin ·was accordingly hospitalizeh 
the LDS Hospital on December 12, 1967. (Ex. 1; R 
278, 453). 
The following morning the cyst was excised rnr 
gically by Dr. Brockbank as planned. (R. 453). Th1 
operation was performed under a spinal anesthetic nil 
ministered by Dr. Eugene l\Iaier. (R. 280, 327-32~i 
Supplies for the anesthetic were furnished by defendan' 
hospital. (R. 282, 329, 334). The surgery proceedrii 
uneventfully and unremarkably. (R. 285). At tit· 
conclusion .of the surgical procedure the patient \\il' 
· tly goui transferred to the recovery room m apparen 
condition. He was checked by the anesthesiologist :r 
l · eturn t• hour or an hour and a half later before us r 
3 
Jiif: own room. At this point everything appeared to be 
satisfactory. (R. 353-354). 
Calvin was returned to his room but as the after-
noon progn~ssed his temperature increased, finally 
reaching 103 ° :B'. ( J1~x. 1, pp. 95, 137; R. 696). The at-
tending nurse notified Dr. Brockbank who prescribed 
a:.;pirin, antibiotic and nrinary catheterization. (R. 290-
292, 296, 302, 320, 4G8-469, 696; Ex. 1, pp. 37, 137). How-
ever, Dr. Brockhank did not elect to visit or examine his 
patient that ewning. (R. 296, 297, 303, 455, 471). During 
the night it was discovered that Calvin had no use or 
control over his legs and had not recovered from the 
effects of the anesthetic. (Ex. 1, p. 137). Dr. Maier was 
notified of this condition the follo\ving morning and 
visited Calvin as soon as possible. (R. 363). Some time 
afterward, Dr. Brockbank in the course of making rounds 
also visited the patient and recognizing the seriousness 
of the problem enlisted the services of Dr. Louis Sch-
ricker, a neurosurgeon, as a consultant. (R. 303, 730). 
Dr. Schricker examined Calvin and made certain recom-
mendations regarding further care. (R. 730). A few 
days later (December 17) the entire care and respons-
ihility of the patient was transferred to Dr. Schricker. 
(R. 735). 
Although various diagnostic tests were performed 
and various medica1tions were administered, no signifi-
cant improvement in the condition of Calvin could be 
ohtained and he nmain!:'d a paraplegic with complete 
loss of motor and sPnsory function of both lower extremi-
4 
tie~ and. of the bowels and bladder. (R. 741 ). He 11 
marned 111 the LDS Hospital for a im·iod f · 
. 0 appr<1x, 
mately three months dunno- all of which t· 
1 . b 1me ie 11·. 
mamed under the care of Dr. 8chricker (R '"36 -
. · I , ti!: 
Ex. 1). He was also seen durincr this iwriod of 1t' 
1 • b u11e 1, 
vanons other specialists, including Dr. ~Iadison Thoma. 
neurologist; Dr. Carter Ballinger anesthesiolocri,·t : 
' to•O : a111J 
Dr. Leonard J archo, neurologist. (Ex. 1, pp. 3, 36, 55-fiL 
R. 736). Dr. ·William Stoops, neurosurgeon and partne• 
of Dr. Schricker, also participated in his care. (Ex. l, 
pp. 79-93 ; R. 736). 
He was later transferred to the University Hospital 
for rehabilitation trea:tment. He has remained a para 
plegic cripple. (R. 741). 
Plaintiffs initiall!' commenced this action againil 
defendant and avpellant LDS Hospital, and against Dr. 
Brockbank, the doctor who performed the surgery, a111l 
Dr. Maier, the anesthesiologist. (R. 1-4). Innumerahl1 
grounds of negligence were alleged as against all dt 
fendants. See original pretrial order, (R. 112-118) anJ 
second pre"trial order (R. 138-145). It will there be note.; 
that plaintiff alleged no less than 26 specifications ol 
negligence as against Dr. Brockbank at the time of th· 
first pretrial and that this had expanded to 34 at the 
time of the second pretrial. (R. 113-115, 139-Hl). Spei: 
ifications of negligence againsit Dr. Maier increased fr 0111 
23 at the time of the first pretrial to 26 at the timer' 
the second pretrial. (R. 115-116, 141-143). Twenty-ow 
1. t d ain "t def endm1! claims of neg igence were asser e ag ~ 
5 
hospital both in the initial preitrial order and in the sub-
;;cqnent pretrial order. (R. 117-118, 144-145). 
The cm;(~ was seheduled for trial March 6, 1972. (R. 
[Ji). On that date the defendant doctors entered into a 
sdtleuwnt arrangement with the plaintiffs. Although 
the terms of the settlement do not appear in the record, 
it is awarent that plaintiffs agreed not to prosecUJte the 
action against them further, and they did not participate 
fnrther as parties, although both of them tes1tified at 
trial. Trial of the ease as against defendant hospital was 
continued until April 24, 1972. (R. 137). 
Although tlH~ nrnltiple claims of negligence against 
tlw hospital as set forth in ithe pretrial order were never 
reduced in number by any formal order, at the conclusion 
of the trial the claims of negligence as against the de-
fendant hospital had boiled down to the single issue of 
whether the hospital had used negligent or improper 
cleansing techniques in cleaning its spinal anesthetic 
t'quipment, in that it used a detergent solution for that 
purpose, and had thereby permitted detergent contami-
nation of its instruments resulting in the injury to Cal-
vin. It was plaintiffs' theory that in some fashion, not 
explained or supported by any evidence, but only in-
ferred, that a minute quantity (trace) of detergent had 
been permitted to remain on the spinal needle used to 
anesthetize Calvin and that this had led to his injury. 
(R. 509). It was defendant's contention, first, that the 
use of' detergent for cleansing spinal instruments in De-
cember, ] 967, was in accordance with the standard of 
6 
care of this community, and further that the 't 
' mo~ Jn11 
bable cause of plaintiff's injury was a reaction t 
tl t . d" . . 0 th1 anes ie ic me icahon itself, rather than to an d t 
Y e e1. 
gelllt contamination. (See record citations post.). 
B - THE EVIDENCE AS TO NEGLIGENCE. 
The only witness offered by the plaintiffs in an pf 
fort to establish their theory of negligffilce was a Dr. 
Peter Rocovich, a neurosurgeon of Los Angeles, Cali 
fornia. (R. 471-473). Serious objections were raisedlr 
defendant as to Dr. Rocovich's qualifications to testlf) 
as to the standard of care of hospitals in this cmmnunlh. 
(R. 483-493). On voir dire examination Dr. Rocorlcil 
admitted that he was not and never had been licem~1i 
to practice in the State of Utah, that he had never un 
dertaken to practice or treat a patient in the State ni 
Utah, that he had never visited a hospital in the Stateo! 
Utah, that he had never received medical training in !111 
State of Utah, that he· limited his practice to neuro-
surgery, that he had no acquaintance with any UM 
physicians and surgeons and that he did not know wha1 
techniques were being used by any hospitals in Utah for 
cleansing of instruments at the time in question. (R.1~11• 
482). Dr. Rocovich failed completely to satisfy th1 
requirements of the Utah locality rule, i.e., of beinr 
familiar with the standard of care in the same commum!! 
Moreover he did not belong to a single specialty soc!eh 
' d" d 1 sing terl1 of national scope, and had never iscusse c ean 
niques with any Utah physicians. (R. 482-483). Howe:er 
after considerable discussion, debate, and consideration 
7 
the trial judge received his testimony as an expert on 
the standard of care of hospitals in this community. 
(R. 483-493, 500, 525, 529, 530). 
Dr. Rocovich likewise failed fo establish any qualifi-
cations to speak on the lombject of technique of cleansing 
of instruments. Admittedly, he was not and never had 
been a hospital administrator. (R. 480). Neither was he 
an anesthesiologist nor trained in their field of expertise. 
(R. 480). He did not profess to have any personal know-
ledge of cleansing 1techniques used by any hospital, either 
in Utah or in his own locality of practice. (R. 561). He 
had never heard of Yale cleaner, the type of detergent 
used by the hospital, as being the cause of any untoward 
rt'actions. (R. 544). Thus he was permitted to testify 
concerning the standard of care of a locality of which he 
knew nothing, and in a field in which he esfablished no 
qnalifications. The decision to receive his testimony was 
of critical importance to the outcome, since absent his 
testimony there would have been insufficient evidence 
to take the case of the jury. 
Dr. Rocovich had never examined the patie:nJt until 
shortly before trial. ( R. 4 78, 4 79, 543). The opinions 
\rhieh he was permitted to express were based upon his 
examination of a copy of the LDS Hospital chart, x-rays, 
copies of depositions of some of the witnesses and 
answers to interrogatories which had been taken in 
preparation for trial, and alleged research in the medical 
literatnrr. (R. 479). However, with respect to the latter, 
he \rns abk to identify only two articles or papers which 
8 
he had examined, and to identify these only i , . n \a~11" 
and gen<>ral terms. (R. 541-542). He was unable t ' 
• • • 0 ,11\1 
m1t the citation of a single medical authoritv upo ,1, J n w 111']1 
he relied for the conclusions which he gav<'. (R. 5-H-54!1 
His conclusions in substance were that pontocai Ilr. 
the anes1thetic agent, is completely safe for use in spinal 
anesthetic if proper techniques arc used, that most re 
ported cases of paraplegia or paralysis following spinal 
anesthetic have been caused by some contaminant ra:tliti 
than by the medi0ation itself, and that therefore sincet]1, 
hospital used detergent to cleanse its instruments tht 
probabilities were 1that Calvin's paraplegia resulted frn111 
detergent contamination rather than from a reaction to 
the anesthetic agent. (R. 543). He did admit, howmr. 
that paraplegia resulting from spinal anesthesia ha~ 
been reported for more than half a century, and lone 
before detergents were known or used. (R. 553). 
He also opined that since the hazard of detemnt 
contamination had been discussed in the medical lilera· 
ture prior to 1967 it was negligencfi for defendant hoi 
pital to use such a cleansing agent for the purpose 111 
cleaning its spinal instrnments. (R. 525). 
All medical witnesses agreed ithat there was sonw 
hazard in all anesthetics including spinal anesthetic~ 
(R. 305, 306, 388-389, 422-423, 567). 
. "ff ' 1 . d f dant prodnc111i In opposition to plamh s c aim, P en 
. rat 
a series of witnesses to establish that its cleansmg P 
!ices and procednreR were in accordance with the stand-
ard of can: of this community a1t the time in question. 
:Hrs. Gladys Bolh described in detail the cleansing 
procrss, including the multiple rinses of all instrnments, 
first in tap water and then in distilled water and finally 
in sterile water after soaking and rinsing in detergent 
solution. (R. 647-651, 667). This was the same 1technique 
1rhich had been in use throughout her employment at the 
LDS Hospital, a period of some 13¥2 years. (R .642, 654). 
Mr. David Wirthlin, associate administrator at the 
hospital, testified that so far back as records were avail-
able, thait is to 1962, the hospital's records indicated that 
an average of more than 1,000 spinal anesthetics were 
administered annually to surgical patients and Calvin's 
ease was the only reported case of paraplegia or other 
serious complications following spinal anesthetic. (R. 
677-678). This fit,11Jre did not include obstetrical cases 
where spinal anesthetics are also commonly used. In the 
only year for which records were available, 1967, more 
than 200 spinal anesithetics were also given in the ob-
stetrical department without untoward event. (R. 678). 
It is a fair inf ere nee that approximately the same num-
h~r would have been used in prior years. Brent Goates, 
the hospital administrator tesitified that in the approxi-
mately 20 years he had served the hospital as admin-
istrator and assistant administrator, he was not aware 
of any otl1er case of paraplegia following spinal anesthe-
tic. (R. 450). To the same effect was ~the testimony of 
Dr. Schricker. (R 772). This in itself is very strong 
10 
evidence of the propriety of the techniq1w sin ·r h . . , ce 1 l'l'a~. 
m techmque occur there are usually several inci'd 
1 
.. 
en sand 
not just one isolated one. (R 570) Plaintiff ' · · s expert 
Dr. Rocovich, admitted that he could not nanw am, 
~rticle in the medical literature which reported a sing!~ 
isolated case of detergent poisoning. (R. 570). 
Mr. Wirthlin's testimony also developed that Yale 
cleaner, the detergent in quesition, was marketed h 
Becton-Dickinson, a reputable manufacturer of hospit;I 
instruments, and was recommended by it for use in 
cleansing needles and syringes. It was developed origin-
ally for factory use. (R. 723, Ex. 16). 
Dr. Harvey -Wong, a board certified anesthesiologi~t. 
who was chief of anesithesiology at LDS Hospital at the 
time of the incident in question, testified that he wa.' 
familiar with medical literature published before m; 
indicating the hazards of detergent contamination, 1!hat 
he was aware of the use of detergents by the LDS Hoi 
pital in the cleansing of its instruments and that he 
considered this in accordance with the sitandard of rare 
of this community at that time, particularly in view of 
the excellent record of no untoward incidents om 1 
long period of time. (R. 681-685). He also pointed on! 
on cross-examination that adverse reactions to spinal 
anesthetics were reported long before detergents wm 
known. (R. 690). 
Mr. Brent Goates, the hospital administrator, \eiti 
fied that the administraition must rely upon its profei 
sional staffs for recommendations which are technical 
11 
in nature and that the Department of Anesthesiology had 
nrver recommended any changes in the cleansing tech-
niques employed by the hospital. (R. 451). Even plain-
tiffs' expert, Dr. R.ocovich, admitted that in technical 
areas standards of hospitals must be, set by appropriate 
specialty groups, and that hospital administrations must 
rely on staff people for advice on technical problems. 
(R. 562). To the same effect was the tesitimony of Dr. 
),faier. (R. 369). 
Dr. Louis Schricker, who had very impressive 
crrdentials in the field of neurosurgery (R. 727-729), 
testified that the cleansing technique was in accordance 
1rith the standard of care of this community at 1that 
time. (R. 742). 
Lorraine Dickson, a nurse anesthetist of 17 years 
experience at St. Mark's Hospital, testified that St. 
Mark's used esse:nitially the same cleansing technique, 
and particularly, used detergents in cleansing its spinal 
instruments and in fact was still doing so up to the time 
of trial. (R. 714, 716, 719-720). She was not aware of any 
incidents of paraplegia having occurred at St. Mark's 
Hospital following spinal anesthesia in ~he 17 years 
she had been there. (R. 720). 
Dr. Schricker testified that according to his infor-
mation Holy Cross Hospital of Salt Lake City also used 
detergents in cleansing its spinal instruments. (R. 760-
7Gl). Thus, the evidence was :that all of the three major 
hospitals in Salt Lake City used detergents in their 
cleansing techniques and there was no evidence whatso-
12 
ever as to what other hospitals in the Salt Lak . · e area or 
m the strute used. (R. 761). 
Dr. Schricker also testified that there coul<l hr. 
more than one cleansing technique which wonld be within 
the standard of care of the community, (R. 772); and Dr. 
Wong testified 1that there were differences of opinion 
within the profession as to how equipment should ht 1 
cleaned. (R. 687). 
C - THE EVIDENCE AS TO CAUSATION. 
As with the issue of negligence, the only evidencr : 
offered by plaintiffs on the issue of causation was the 
testimony of Dr. Rocovich. (R. 509, 515). Among other 
infirmities in his testimony, Dr. Rocovich admitted that 
he was not an expert in detergents, and that he bad 
never seen a case of paralysis or injuries resulting from 
detergent contamination. (R. 544). Again, his views were 
based entirely upon a reading of the records and alleg11l 
medical research. (R. 551). 
The cause of Calvin's paraplegia was at best highl: 
obscure. (Ex. 1, p. 1; R. 319, 366, 397). He was examined 
by many experts during his stay at the LDS Hospvtalanrl 
as many as eight or nine different possibilities as to the 
cause of his condition were suggested. These included 
allergic reaction (to medication or contamination); im· 
muno-chemical reaction (to medicrution or contaminant): 
bacterial infection, hematoma, hamartoma, concun'.n! 
independent infection, abscess and contamina:tion of rn· 
13 
struments (bacterial or chemical). (Ex. 1; R. 348-349, 
35~, 385, 398, 402, 730, 731, 734, 735, 736, 738). Some of 
these causes were eliminated during the course of his 
hospital care either by surgical explorntion or by the 
clinical course of the disease process itself. (R. 421, 745, 
746, 747, 7G5). However, at the time Calvin was dis-
charged from the LDS Hospital the cause of his adhesive 
arachnoidi1tis was still shown as "Unknown." (Ex. 1, p. 
1). 
The three doctors who testified and who ventured to 
express an opinion as to causation (Drs. Maier, Roco-
rich and Schricker) were in agreement that all of the 
possible causes could be eliminated as probable causes 
except two. (R. 504-505, 506, 745, 746, 747, 765). Dr. 
SchrickPr and Dr. Maier, the two doctors who had the 
most to do with Calvin's care throughout his course at the 
LDS Hospital, were of the opinion that the most probable 
cause was a reaction to the anesthetic medication. (R. 402, 
±04, 424, 747, 766). However, Dr. Maier could not rule 
ont with certainty detergent conitamination as a possible 
cause. (R. 402). Dr. Rocovich on the other hand was of the 
opinion that detergent contamination was the most prob-
ahle cause but he could not rule out reaction to the medi-
cation. (R. 509, 515, 577). Dr. Schricker and Dr. Maier 
gave several convincing reasons for their opinions, some 
of which were as follows : 
1. Tt was dt>finitely known that the plaintiff had 
Meived a dose of pontocaine. (R. 404). This is known to 
~ause reactions in a few patients (Ex. 6; R. 386, 732). 
14 
There was nothing but speculative evidence tli t I 
· a ie ha1 
ever received even a minute amount of detergent. · 
2. The clinical course followed by the patient wa, 
consistent ·with reaction to anesthetic and incons· t . 
is en: 
with 1the reported case histories of detergent contamina 
tion. Calvin, in effect, never came out of the anesthek 
The effects were immediate and irreversible. Patient 
who sustain injury from detergent contamination usualli 
do not experience severe symptoms for sewral weet' 
or even months following administration. It takes time 
for detergent contamination to work its mischief. (R 
404,405, 743, 744,771). 
3. Paralysis and other symptoms of meningitJ~ 
caused by detergent contamination usually follow a he 
nign course and the patient recovers spontaneously witl1 
in a period of days. ( R. 423). In this instance the res1tlt5 
were permanent and irreversible. 
4. The damage to 1the spinal cord was extensiw 
over most of its length from the level of the eleventl1 
dorsal vertebra to the lower lumbar region. (R. 740). It 
is unlikely that such profound damage could have re· 
sulted from a minute amount of detergent as compared 
to a normal dosage of pontocaine. (R. 745, 766, 771). 
5. 'Where meningitis results from contaminate~ in· 
struments, there is usually a series of cases, and notJmt 
an isolated one. (R. 570). 
tl ·a ce that In addition to the above, there was 1e evi en . 
the seller of the pontocaine put in every package sold, ill 
15 
acPordancc with requirements of 1the Food and Drug 
Atlministration, a warning that serious consequences, 
including paraplegia and paralysis, on rare occasions 
sometimes follow spinal anesthetic. (Ex. 6; R. 386, 387, 
412, 413, 554, 744). 
Plaintiffs' entire theory of causation rests solely 
upon an assumption, wholly unsupported by any direct 
evidence, that there was de1tergent contamination of the 
anesthetic equipment. From a tragic result, plaintiffs 
attempt to reason backward to a case of liability. They 
seek to lift themselves by their own booitstraps. 
D - OTHER PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE ARIS-
ING AT TRIAL. 
Plaintiffs called as their first witness Dr. Carl 
Brockbank. (R. 276 et seq.). Although leave was sought 
to e:icamine him as an adverse or hostile witness, per-
mission to do so was refused by the court in view of the 
fact 1that he was no longer a party to the action and 
manifestc>d no hostility to the plaintiff. (R. 276-277). 
Dr. Brockbank testified generally to the course of the 
plaintiff under his care from the time of the initial office 
examination on December 11 ull'til the time his total care 
was referred to Dr. Schricker. (R. 278-298). On cross-
examination, after reviewing several entries in the hos-
pital chart (Ex. 1), he corrected some of his testimony 
on dired examination and admitted thaJt he had been 
16 
notified of Calvin's elevated temperature on th . 
e evemn,, 
of surgery and not the following morning as he ha; 
earlier testified. (R. 299-302). 
None of Dr. Brockbank's testimony was nnfavorablP 
to plain1tiff s. It served to establish a factual backgronnrl 
for the later critical testimony of others on the basic , 
issues of negligence and causation. Dr. Brockbank ex. 
pressed no opinion whatsoever on those critical issuei. 
His testimony also tended to exclude his 1treatment, aud 
that of Dr. Maier, as possible causes of plaintiff's 
mJunes. 
However, on the following day Dr. Brockbank was 
recalled by the plaintiff and was subjected to an argn-
mentaJtive interrogation for the purported purpose of 
laying a foundation for impeaching him by interrogating 
him with regard to certain statements which he had al· 
legedly made to one Evelyn Lloyd, a family friend of 
the plaintiffs. (R. 429, 431). He denied at trial, as he 
had denied on deposition, that he had ever made the 
statemenits imputed to him (R. 434-435), namely that he 
had said that the hospital hired unskilled people to do 
important jobs, that Calvin's injury resulted from con· 
taminated instruments or detergent on instruments, ana 
tha1t he ought to sue for more money. (R. 432). Owr 
violent objections of the defendant this testimony 1133 
received on the authority of Rules 20 and 22, Rules of 
Evidence as adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah. 
(R. 432-433). 
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Plaintiffs were then permitted to call Evelyn Lloyd 
and she was permiltted to testify (over objection, and for 
the alleged purpose of impe1aching Dr. Brockbank) as to 
conversations she had with Dr. Brockbank in which he 
allegedly said that Calvin's condition was the result of 
dirty equipment - a dirty needle - probably with a 
residue of detergent, and also that the hospital hired 
people off the street and gave them little salary and 
training for a very vital job. (R. 437-438). She further 
testified that similar views were repeated in several 
subsequent conversa:tions throughout the month. (R. 438-
439). Thus in the guise of impeaching their own witness 
plaintiffs were successful in getting before. the jury 
hearsay evidence which was highly prejudicial to the 
hospital, and which was otherwise wholly inadmissible. 
In support of plaintiffs' claim for damages, plain-
tiffs called Dr. Paul L. Hannon, a Ph.D., to testify as to 
Calvin's economic loss. (R. 579). This witness testified 
that he had made a study of the economic loss which 
would be sustained by a 20 year old male paraplegic. 
(R. 583). He had gaJthe·red data from the Bureau of 
Census and other publications, (all unidentified). He had 
conducted "a survey of experts." Out of this so-called 
study he had applied his own judgment and had come 
up with "some sort of figure." (R. 583). On the basis 
of this foundatron he was permitted to testify, over ob-
j<'ction of the def endan1t, that the loss sustained by a 
college graduate would he $300,000.00 and the loss by a 
high sehool graduate $200,000.00. (R. 590-592). Inter-
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estingly, the higher figure coincides with the ve d' t r le for 
general damages awarded to the plaintiff Calvin Joh ~ 
(R. 238). neon. 
Upon cross-examination the witness admiitted thalht 
h~d no acq~aintance with tlrn plaintiff, knew nothing o! 
his academ:tc record or of his vocational ambitions 01 
aptitudes. The figures he used were nothing more than 1 
gross averages. (R. 593). The figures were national 
figures not limited to Utah or to 1the western states, 
although he admitted earnings varied widely from ont 
locality to another, and that Utah is among the lower 
I 
income states in the union. (R. 594). He further admittea 
that he had not taken into account state and federal in. 
come taxes and that his estimates were gross figures 
(R. 595). However, he did admit 1that there was f>conomic 
certainty that there would be income taxes as far aheaa 
as anyone can foresee and that something would have to 
be taken out of his estimates to give a true value in tenm 
of actual loss ito the plaintiff. (R. 595). 
On re-direct eX'amination he testified that he ha1l 
surveyed about twenty people whom he considered to he 
experts in some field. These included economists, th1 
Director of Rehabilitati·on Center at 1the University Medi-
cal Center, the Director of Research at Utah State ana 
"similar experts." (R. 600). He admitted 1that he "wantei! 
their opinions before I made my judgment" and that ht 
took their opinions and came up with his opinions. (R 
601-602). Defendant then moved to strike his entll 
testimony on the grounds that it was based upon hearsa). 
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conjecture and speculation. The court reserved ruling on 
the motion at that time (R. 604), but subsequently denied 
it. (R. 790). 
E - SUMMARY 
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence defendant 
movr,d 1to strike the testimony of Dr. Rocovich and for 
a directed verdict. (R. 640-641). Both motions were 
denied. (R. 641). Thereafter, at the conclusion of the 
entire evidence the motion for directed verdict was re-
newed and again denied. (R. 790). The case was sub-
mitted to the jury which reJturned a verdict in favor of 
plaintiff Calvin Johnson for general damags in the 
am01mt of $300,000.00 and to, his father for special dam-
ages in the undisputed amount of the medical bills, 
$25,623.79. (R. 238). Thereafter, defendant made a motion 
for judgmen1t notwithstanding the verdict or in the alter-
native for a new trial which motion was argued to the 
court, ~aken under advisement and subsequently denied. 
(R. 253, 260). This appeal followed. (R. 262). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING THE 
OPINION TESTIMONY OF DR. ROCOVICH CON-
CERNING THE STANDARD OF CARE OF HOS-
PITALS IN THIS COMMUNITY. 
This court has traditionally and consistently followed 
what is commonly called the strict locality or vicin~ty 
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rule with respect to medical malpractice litigat' 1 ion. Tnrir· 
this rule the plaintiff has the burden of showin{)' ff' . ' . ha 1r111i 
tively that the defendan1t did not exercise reasona\'i 
d 
, le 
care an slnll ordinarily exercised bv other pract't· 
•1 1 toner .. 
of the same school and of the same specialty standin'" 
11 
the sanie locality. Baxter v. Snow, (1931) 78 u. ;Ji. 
2 P.2d 257; Baker v. Wycoff, (1938) 95 U. 199, 79 P.!1J 1 
77; Edwards v. Clark, (1938) 96 U. 121, 83 P.2d 1021. 
Anderson v. Nixon, (1943) 104 U. 262, 139 P.2d 21fl: 
Hitggins v. Hicken, (1957) 6 U. 2d 233, 310 P.2d 5~~: 
Marsh v. Pemberton, (1959) 10 U. 2d 40, 347 P.2d 110~. 
A very interesting case recently decided by the Conn l 
of Appeals for 1the Tenth Circuit is Miirphy v. Dy1r 
(1969) 409 F. 2d 7 47. In that case plaintiff brought action 
against an obstetrician practicing in Colorado Spring' 
Colorado, and alleging that his negligent administration 
of spinal anesthetic resulted in neurologieal deficiencie; 
akin to those sustained by 1the plaintiff here. Plaintiffi 
offered the testimony of Dr. Daniel Moore, a renowneu 
anesthesiologist and an acknowledged expert in tlia1 
field, from Seattle, Washington. On objection of the de-
fendant, the testimony of Dr. Moore was excluded, in lhe 
absence of a showing that he was familiar with tbP 
standards practiced in Colorado Springs or similar com 
munities and for the further reason that his special\:. 
' 
was different from 1that of the defendant. The court 1 
noted that Colorado followed the Restatement rule as set 
forth in the Restatement of Torts 2d, ~299A, to which we 
shall presently advert. Said the court: 
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"There is no predicate in 1this record that Dr. 
Moore was familiar with the prevailing practices 
in Colorado Springs or that the anesthesiologists 
in Colorado Springs follow the 'generally adhered 
to' textbook standards of Dr. Moore. Dr. Dyer 
recognized Dr. Moore as 'one of many authorities' 
in the field but he said he did not follow Dr. 
Moore's technique. While it may no1t make good 
evidentiary sense to say that a renowned specialist 
is incompetent to testify concerning standards of 
care in the practice of his specialty, it does seem 
to be the prevailing rule in Colorado .... Likewise 
the plaintiff made no showing 1that the standards 
of administering a spinal anesthetic would be the 
same for a certified obstetrician as for a certified 
anesthesiologist. In the area of professional stand-
ards the law is guided by expert testimony. With-
out this showing plaintiff failed, as a matter of 
law, to qualify Dr. Moore to testify relating to the 
facts in this case. The exclusion was proper and 
must be sustained." 
The logic of the court as above quoted appears to be 
fully applicable here and, we submit, should be followed 
here. Other cases of like import are Bryant v. Biggs, 
(1951) 331 Mich. 64, 49 N.W. 2d 63; Naccarato v. Grob, 
(1968) 12 Mich. App. 130, 162 N.W. 2d 305; Michael v. 
Ro/Jerts, (1941) 91 N.H. 499, 23 A. 2d 361; Correia v. 
U.S. (1964) (1st Cir.) 339 F.2d 596; and Lockhart v. 
Maclean, (1961) (Nev.) 361P.2d670. 
Most of the cases involving this general question 
involve claims against doctors or other practitioners of 
the healing arts such as osteopaths, chiropractors, etc. 
However, it seems to be implied and understood thaJt the 
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same rules are applicable to hospitals. On" I " sue 1 ca,~ 
dealing with the liability of a hosr)ital is Di.ck
1
• . • 
·i1S0111· 
Malliard, et al., (1970) (Ia.) 175 N.W. 2d 588. In tlir;: 
case the court held that the correct sitandard of caret,, 
which hospitals should be held was that which obtaineri 
in hospitals generally under similar circumstances. Iii 
deciding what are "similar circumstances," the jury nm 
con.sider the customs and practices followed in the pa;. 
iti.cular community and like communities. The court aho 
specifically pointed out that there must be competenteii. 
dence upon which to find that a hospital has faile<l I'! 
meet the standard of care required of it. 
The Restatement of Torts 2d has adopted a rult 
slightly more liberal than the traditional rule of tlii~ 
state, as set forth in §299A: 
"Unless he represents that he has greater or 
less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes t" 
render services in the praetice of a profe~sion m 
trade is required to exercise the skill and k11011l 
edge normally possessed by members of that prn 
f ession or trade in good standing in similar COii1 
m icnities ." (Emphasis ours.) 
The strict locality or vicinity rule fixes the standarJ 
of care as that which prevails in the community wheri 
the defendant practices. The Restatement rule enlarge' 
this to fix the standard as that prevailing in similai 
. · A · d t · th 1ment thereunder, commumtrns. s pomte ou m e con · 
there are valid reasons for this. Under eomment (g) t111 
reporter sta1te1s: 
" The standard is rather that of pe~·s.ons 111 
· · · · · · ·1ar localities cnn gaged in similar practice m s1m1 
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sidering geographical location, size, and the char-
acter of the community in general. 
"Such allowance for the type of community is 
most frequently made in professions or fr~des 
where there is a considerable degree of variation 
in the skill and knowledge possessed by those 
practicing it in different localities. It has com-
monly been made in the cases of physicians or 
surgeons, because of the difference in the medical 
skill commonly found in different parts of the 
United States, or in differenrt types of communi-
ties .... " 
We recognize that some writers have advocated a 
complete abandonment of the locality rule and the adop-
tion of national standards. The reasons commonly as-
serted for this position are thait the profession itself 
has national board examinations and national standards 
to which its specialist must adhere and that the medical 
profession recognizes no local variation, and that there-
fore the com1ts should not either. This thinking has been 
followed by some courts. In the recent case of K ronke v. 
Danielson, ( 1972) (Ariz.) 499 P .2d J 56, the court said: 
"It is well known that the various specialties of 
medicine have set up uniform requirements for 
certification of specialists. The length of resi-
dency training, subjects to be covered, and even 
examinaJtions are established by the national 
boards. Since medicine recognizes a standard for 
speciali·sts not based on geography, the law should 
join in upholding such standards. 
"We hold that, for a plaintiff to recover in a 
medical malpractice case involving a specialist, 
he must prove that the defendant specialist in 
24 
hi~ acts failed to meet the sitandard ( f , ,. 
d f h · · . J CU>t• 11 qmre o p ys1cians m the same s11ec1'al't. 
t . · · 1 .Y prar JCed by the defendant. To qualifi1 aii. ex·
11
, ., · 
· . ,; ti 1 /., ~xpress an opmion on what that standard t' 
f tl · l" o rn1, isff o~ iet7 spec~a ity of the defendant, the )!artd o erzng ie witness nmst establish the 1cit1 ,, 
knowledge a1nd familiarity with the sta11rlrll';i,, 
c~re and treatrn_ent commonly practiced by )Jhii.,i 
cians engaged in the same type of sveciality a 1 
the defendant." (Emphasis ours.) · 
Interestingly enough, the ubiquitous Dr. Rocovicl 
whose activitie1s in Utah give rise to the present CM, 
likewise was the doctor involved in the Kronke cast. 
Although 1that fact does not appear in the formal opinion 1 
of the court as reported under the above citation, the 
original order of the court, quoted in the case of Hoefftl 
v. Campbell, (1972) (Ariz. App.) 494 P.2d 777, makei 
clear that the same Dr. Peter Rocovich is involved. 
The reasons commonly advanced for departing from 
the local or similar community standard tn a nrutionaJ 
standard do not exist in this case. Although Dr. Roro· 
vich on direct examination testified that he was "boanl 
qualified," (R. 474), he was forced to admit, on cross 
examination, that he had flunked 1the board examination' 
for his specialty on the only occasion on which he toot 
them. (R. 538-539). Thus he not only was not boarn 
certified but bv te,st, was not board qualified. He further 
admitted that. he did not belong to a single special~ · 
society which was national in scope. (R. 482). He did no! 
. C 11 f S ns or to an1 belong to the American o ege o urgeo . . . ·. 
other professional society which wais selective ID ib 
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admissions standards beyond a mere requirement of 
having been licensed to practice medicine. (R. 539). 
On the basis of his lack of qualifications as to any 
kind of a national standard, the testimony of Dr. Roco-
vich should no1t have been received, even with regard to 
the standard of care of a neurosurgeon practicing in this 
community. Ho~wever, there was no neurosurgeon named 
as defendant. The defendant was a hospital. With re-
spect to the proper cleansing and sterilizing of anesthetic 
supplies the hospital relied for rts 1technical advice on, its 
Department of Anesthe1siology staff members. Just as 
it was beyond the province of Dr. Moore to testify as to 
the standard of care of an obstetrician pracJticing in 
Colorado Springs, it was beyond the province of Dr. 
Rocovich to testify as to the standard of care of a hos-
pital or an anesthesiologist practicing in Salt Lake City. 
We respectfully suggesit that any relaxation of the 
traditional locality rule should be undertaken with the 
utmost caution. Any such relaxation invites the 1testi-
mony of foreign quacks and charlatans who are nothing 
more than professional witnesses without erither pro-
fessional qualifications or conscience. If the doors are 
to be opened to the testimony of professional witnesses 
from ou1tside the state to testify as to the standards of 
care of local professionals, care should be taken that such 
alleged experts are in fact what they purport to be, and 
that they do have those professional qualifications which 
would qualify them to pass judgment upon the pro-
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fessional conduct of local physicians. Such a showing. 
completely absent he,re. 1 ~ 
Under the traditional locality rule which th' is court 
has he.retofore consist:ntly followed, the testimony of Dr. 
Rocovich was clearly madmissible Even under tli . · e mon 
liberal rule (which has never yet been followed b ·1 · y till.' 
court), no proper foundation for the testimony of Dr. 1 
Rocovich was ever laid, and it would be equally inadmis,. 
ible under that rule. For this reason alone, the judgment 
should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE 
AT THE END OF PLAINTIFFS' CASE AND AGAIN 
AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL OF THE EVI-
DENCE AND IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION "A" WHICH WAS A RE-
QUEST FOR A PEREMPTORY INSTRUCTION AND 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDG-
MENT N.O.V. 
The only evidence offered by the plaintiffs in snpporl 
of their claim that the defendant was negligent in ih 
procedures for cleansing anesthe1tic instruments and sup· 
plies was the testimony of Dr. Rocovich. If this court 1 
rule's, as we advocate it must, that such testimony irni 
. · d d hould haw erroneously and improperly receive an s .· 
. ·a · the rec-0rd been stricken, there remams no ev1 ence m 
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npon which a jury could base a finding of negligence 
upon the part of the defendant. 
It is true that a couple of witnesses testified in 
response to questions propounded by plain.tiffs' attorney 
that if the hospital furnished the anesthesiologist with 
a needle contaminaJted with detergent such would fall 
below the standard of care of this community. However, 
there was no fotmdation for such questions. There was no 
evidence that the needle was contaminated except such 
as could be inferred from the fact that an accident oc-
curred. It is axiomaJtic, of course, that the mere occur-
rence of an accident is no evidence whatsoever of any 
negligence upon the part of the actor. Jackson v. Colsto1n, 
(1949), 116 Ut. 295, 209 P.2nd 566. Under the Utah 
authorities cited under Point I and under general prin-
ciplt>s of negligence law the plaintiff simply failed to 
make a prima facie case and the court should have 
directed a verdict in defendant's favor, and having failed 
to do that, should have granted defendant's motion for 
a judgment n.o.v. 
The language of this court in Jackson v. Colston, 
supra, is apropos here: 
"Analyzing the testimony to d~termine whether or 
not plaintiff has sustained a burden of proving a 
causal connection between the alleged negligent 
acts of the defendants and the injury to the plain-
tiff, -vve find that under the present record the 
jury would be required to speculate and guess on 
too many elements in the chain of causation." 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING, AND IN 
REFUSING TO STRIKE, THE TESTIMONY OF THE 
WITNESS PAUL HARMON. 
As noted in our Statement of Facts, the so-callPii 
expert opinions rende,red by Dr. Harmon were not baseil 
upon any testimony or evidence received at <trial or upoi 
any identifiable government documents or other math 1 
of public record. They were admittedly and candidh 
based upon unidentified statistical information obtaine;: 
from the Bureiau of Census and upon the opinions IJ! 
some twenty alleged experts in various fields, none oi : 
whom appe1ared as a witness in court and none of who, 
personal views were even communicated to the court. The 
authorities are uniform in holding that expert testimon: 
must be based either upon actual knowledge of the exper 
himself or upon facts of which there is evidence in thP 
record. Neither of these conditions are presffilt here. 
The rule is stated in 2 Jones on Evidence, §421, I'· 
794 as follows : 
"While as noted in the foregoing sections. all 
expeirt 'witness may base an opinion upon his 11er : 
sonal knowledge or observwtions, or upon teflt 
mony which has been given by others and 1rlwl, 
has been heard or read by him, it is ti:e settl111 
rule that an expert may not give in e~ulcnce ni, 
opinion which is based upon information ga1111 1 
from the statements of others oidside the cdoiidrl · h · · s won! 1 roorn since in such case t e op1mon 
pend ~pon hearsay." (Emphasis ours.) 
and at page 796 the same author says: 
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"Likiwrise, the opinion of an expert witness how-
ever well qualified he may be, may not b~ pre-
dicated either wholly or in part upon opinions, 
inferences or conclusions of other witnesses either 
" ' expert or lay. 
To the same effect is 31 Am Jur 2d 546, Expert and 
Opinion Evidence, §42 : 
"The opinion of an expert cannot be based either 
im whole or vn part upon the opinions, inferences, 
and conclusions of other witnesses, although he 
may express an opinion based upon facts tesitified 
to, or upon a test made, by another expert wit-
ness. . . . The same stringeint rule opera!tes to 
exclude testimony of experts given in answer to 
hypothetical questions which incorporate opinions, 
inferemces, and conclusions of others, as where the 
questions are asked directly on those opinions, 
inferences, and conclusions. 
"A witness cannot be allowed to give an opinion 
based on hearsay or his own idea of what the 
evidence was or might have been .... " (Emphasis 
ours.) 
See also 32 C.J.S. 266, Evidence §546(63): 
"The opinion of an expert witness must be based 
on facts in evidence, and cannot be based on opin-
ions, conclusions, or inferences of others. How-
ever, it may be based on facts testified to· by 
others." (Emphasis ours.) 
and op. cit., p. 268 : 
"Ordinarily an expert witness may not base his 
opinion on facts derived from sources other than 
the evidence in 1the case, and he may not state a 
judgment based on mere conjecture ... · 
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"Except in special circumstances ex ··t .. ·a 7 . 1 . ' . pr1 o1n;1 evi ence w uc i is based on hearsa1 · · '.' '7l S t1 . . . y is inar/111,, 
i J_ e. o _ie op~nion of an :xpert may not 111 i·· 
dicated, either in whole or in part 011 tl, . . 1 · f d . . ,c O]Jilll11 1, in erences, an conclus1011s of other'' .
1 1 1 . . . f o, \\ J1•t ,·· 
sue 1 op1mons, m erences, and conclnsions h th 
of other experts or of lav witnesses·,, (E, e 
1 
°' 
) · • · rnpia•. ours. ' 
The following cases are illustrative of the rnl·· 1 
State of New Jersey, etc. v. Lichtman., et al., (1961) t'.i 
N.J. Super. 386, 169 A. 2d 184; State v. Grvrez, (19µ, 
61 Ariz. 296, 148 P.2d 829; O'Brien v. Wallacr, (19ji, 
137 Colo. 253, 324 P.2d 1028; Zelenka v. Ind. Comm., llij 
1 
0 St. 587, 138 N.E. 2d 667: 
". . . it is well settled that the opinion of a11 r. 
pert witness cannot be predicated either in 1rl1ril 
or vn part itpon the opinions, inferencl's a11d co,, 
clusions of others, whether expert or lay 1ri1 
nesses." (Emphasis ours.) 
The prejudicial effect of this tes1timony is clear!: 
indicated by the jury verdict which is in the highPil 
amount suggested by the witness as the probable eco· 
nomic loss to the plaintiff over the course of his lifetirn1" 
The jury did not even deduct from 1the amount of thP 1 
verdict any amount for income tax which would surel1 
have been taken from the earnings of the plaintiff ai 
even Dr. Harmon readily conceded on cross-examination , 
Expert testimony should be received with consider· I 
able caution since the expert to a degree performs tlw 
function of 1the trier of fact in expressing opinions on 
ultimate issues of fact. Care should be taken that tbe~e 
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opinions truly are the conclusions of an expert and that 
they are based upon evidence received in court and are not 
mere guesses, or based upon investigation conducted 
hy the expert outside the courtroom as to which there is 
no evidence and as to which there is no opportunity for 
cross-examination. 
The testimony of Dr. Harmon wholly fails to meet 
the minimum requirements for admission of expert testi-
mony and clearly should have been rejected, and having 
once been received, should have been stricken on defend-
ant's motion. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAIN-
TIFFS' COUNSEL TO RECALL DR. BROCKBANK 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF LAYING A FOUNDATION 
FOR IMPEACHMENT AND IN RECEIVING THE 
HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF MRS. LLOYD FOR IM-
PEACHMENT PURPOSES. 
We recognize that under Rule 20 of the Rules of Evi-
dence a party may in a proper ca:se impeach his own 
witness. However, we do not think that it was the intent 
or purpose of the rule to open doors wide for the admis-
sion of testimony, otherwise inadmissible, under 1the guise 
of impeachment. 
Dr. Brockbank was called as a witness by the plain-
tiff at trial. He testified at some length and in con-
siderable detail as to his role in the Calvin Johnson in-
cident. His testimony was in substanJtial accord with 
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his testimony on deposition. The only deviat
1
·
0 n nofrrl 
was that on deposition, and on direct examin t' " 
. . . a ion a 
trial, he testified that he received notice of Calv' , 
msele 
vated temperature on the early morning of December It 
by telephone call from the hospital. However, he wasarl 
mittedly uncertain about the time of receiving the ca~ 
On cro1ss-examination at trial, after reviewing several 
1 
entries in the hospital chart, all of which tended to inili 
ca te that the call was on the evening of December 13, Dr. 
Brockbank concluded that the call must have been re 
ceived at that time ratlrnr than the next morning. Em 
if this represented a departure from his prior testimon1 
1 
it was not a significant one. 
Plaintiffs' own witnesses, Drs. Rocovich and Maier, 
te1stfied that the damage to plaintiff1s spinal cord octnr· 
red immediately after injection of the spinal anesthetlc. 
and within an hour or two was wholly irreversible. Frow 
the standpoint of liabiMy o.f the hospital it made m: 
little difference whether Dr. Brockbank received the call 
on the evening of December 13 or on the morning of De· 
cember 14. There wa,s, therefore, no apparent need, 
justification nor excuse for attempting to impeach him. 
Nonetheless, he was recalled on the second day of ~rial 
and interrogated as to statements he allegedly made 
shortly after the incident occurred, charging the hospital 
with the grossest kind o.f negligence in the hirin~ of its 
· d · th 1 ·ng of rnstrn· employees and care exercise rn e c eans1 . 
ments. All of this Dr. Brockbank had denied on depost· 
tion and denied at trial. 
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Plaintiffs then called Mrs. Lloyd to testify as to a 
series of conversations which she had with. Dr. Brock-
bank, all of which were hearsay as to the hospital, in 
which Dr. Brockbank allegedly made statements highly 
critical of tht~ hospital and assigning the blame for the 
incident to it. Clearly this testimony could no1t have 
been received as independent evidence of negligence on 
the part of the hospital since it was hearsay of the 
rankest sort. It was received only on the preteX!t of 
impeaching Dr. Brockbank's testimony. Yet there was no 
reason to impeach Dr. Brockbank. This was a clear 
abuse of the impeachment process and by use thereof 
plaintiffs got before the jury testimony highly prejudi-
r,ial fo the defendant which was clearly inadmissible. We 
are unable to find any reported case where this procedure 
has ever been attempted, much less condoned. 
On this appeal we have not made the contention that 
the verdict is excessive as a matter of law. We do ob-
serve, however, thaJt it was extremely high for this local-
ity. We are not able to find that any jury in this state 
in either the state or federal court has ever returned a 
verdict of this proportion for any kind of injury to one 
person. While we recognize the seriousness of plaintiff's 
injury, we point out that a verdict of a substantially 
leHser amount might well have been awarded as adequate 
compensation for plaintiff's loss. The enormity of the 
verdict here almost certainly resulted from the improper-
ly admitte-d testimony of Dr. Harmon, and quite probably 
from the highly inflammatory hearsay tes1timony of Mrs. 
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LJoyd. Defendant was clearly prejudiced by th 
er~~ tion of this evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no competent evidence in the rerord frorr 
which a jury could find negligence upon the part of thi 
defendant hospital or that plaintiff's injuries resultaj 
from any negligence on the part of the hospital. The 
verdict and judgment entered thereon should be setasine 
with directions to enter judgment in favor of the defenn. 
ant and agains1t the plaintiff, no cause of action. Atilie 
verv least defendant is entitled to a new trial by rea.101 
of erroneous and prejudicial rulings on evidence by ilie 
trial court. 
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